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Robert Dahl and the Right to 
Workplace Democracy 
Robert Mayer 
Do employees possess a moral right to democratic voice at work? In A Preface 
To Economic Democracy and other writings over the past two decades, Robert Dahl 
has developed a neo-Kantian proof for the existence of such a right. Even if we 
accept the norm of distributive justice upon which Dahl founds his proof, voluntary 
subjection to authoritarian power in firms does not violate the legitimate 
entitlements of employees. While adult residents of territorial ssociations do 
possess a moral right to political equality, polities and firms are qualitatively 
different types of associations in which the entitlements of subjects are distinct. 
Subjection to power is acquired in different ways in the two kinds of associations, 
and this difference deprives employees-but not residents-of a right to democratic 
voice as a matter of moral desert. 
Throughout his career, Robert Dahl has been troubled by the 
different ways in which those who govern polities and firms are 
chosen in modern society. While democracy is the norm in the 
state, at least in the advanced industrial nations, authoritarianism 
prevails in the economy. Most employees are subject to managers 
they did not elect and to rules in which they had little or no say. 
They are subordinates, a role manifestly at odds with the ideal of 
the democratic citizen. Given the "contradictions between our 
commitment to the democratic ideal and the theory and practice 
of hierarchy in our daily lives,"' Dahl has expressed interest from 
his earliest publications in reestablishing symmetry between polity 
and economy through the democratic transformation of work. 
Today Dahl is one of the most prominent advocates of workplace 
democracy in America, having devoted a book and numerous 
articles and chapters to the subject over the past six decades.2 
1. Robert Dahl, "Liberal Democracy in the United States," inA Prospect of Liberal 
Democracy, ed. William Livingston (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979), p. 68. 
2. For Dahl's early interest in economic democracy see "On the Theory of 
Democratic Socialism," Plan Age 6 (1940): 325-56; "Workers' Control of Industry 
and the British Labor Party," American Political Science Review 41 (1947): 875-900; 
and Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom, Politics, Economics, and Welfare (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1953), pp. 473-83. His most important normative writings on 
workplace democracy are After the Revolution?: Authority in a Good Society (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), pp. 115-40; "Power to the Workers?" New 
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222 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS 
But although a consistent advocate of the democratic 
reorganization of work, Dahl's strategy of justification for this 
alternative has evolved during the course of his career. Until the 
middle 1970s, Dahl framed the argument for workplace 
democracy in terms of its relative desirability by contrast with 
the authoritarian firm. In After the Revolution?, for instance, Dahl 
was concerned to identify "the most desirable system of authority" 
in different kinds of associations according to the ability of a 
structure to optimize the values of personal choice, competence 
and economy. He argued that on this standard the "Corporate 
Leviathan" is "ludicrously far from optimal," given that it violates 
the criterion of personal choice, and that "self-management seems 
to me closer to the optimal than bureaucratic socialism or interest 
group management."3 
As Dahl began to develop a theory of procedural democracy 
in the later 1970s, however, a new method of justification for 
workplace democracy emerged alongside his earlier approach. 
In A Preface to Economic Democracy and other writings, Dahl now 
claimed that the self-managed firm is not merely desirable by 
contrast with the alternatives but is also a moral right of 
employees. According to this argument, labor is entitled to 
democratic voice in the firm as a matter of right, as a kind of 
compensation for subjection to the rules. In this way Dahl shifted 
the debate about workplace democracy from the question of its 
consequences to the question of what justice demands. If power 
at work is a moral right of employees, then it is the entitlements 
of the individual that matter and not merely the relative 
desirability of this set of arrangements. Moral rights must be 
York Review of Books 15 (19 November 1970): 20-24; "Governing the Giant 
Corporation," in Corporate Power in America, ed. Ralph Nader and Mark Green 
(New York: Grossman Publishers, 1973), pp. 10-24; "On Removing Certain 
Impediments to Democracy in the United States," Political Science Quarterly 92 
(1977) 1-20; Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy vs. Control (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1982), pp. 126-33,197-205; "Democracy in the Workplace: Is 
it a Right or a Privilege?" Dissent 31 (1984): 54-60; A Preface to Economic Democracy 
(Berkeley: Unversity of California Press, 1985); "Sketches for a Democratic Utopia," 
Scandinavian Political Studies 10 (1987): 195-206; Democracy and Its Critics (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), pp. 325-32; and "Economics, Politics, and 
Democracy," in Toward Democracy: A Journey (Berkeley: Institute of Governmental 
Studies Press, 1997), pp. 547-51. 
3. Dahl, After the Revolution?, pp. 56, 140. 
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respected even if they do not benefit others, and this means that 
if Dahl's later argument is correct, then the consequentialist one 
is of only secondary importance. 
Dahl's moral-rights argument, however, is not persuasive. 
Democratic voice in the firm is not a right to which employees 
are morally entitled, or so I hope to show. In the following pages 
I critically examine Dahl's proof for the existence of a moral right 
to workplace democracy. I also review the counterarguments that 
have been advanced thus far, which suffer from their own 
weaknesses. I show that according to the norm of distributive 
justice Dahl himself accepts, voluntary subjection to 
authoritarian power in the firm does not violate the legitimate 
entitlements of employees. This is not true in political 
associations, for subjects of a polity are indeed entitled to 
democratic voice as a matter of right, if we accept that equals 
must be treated equally. Against Dahl, however, I insist that 
polities and firms are qualitatively different types of associations 
in which the entitlements of subjects are distinct. Subjection to 
power is acquired in different ways in the two kinds of 
associations, and this difference deprives employees-but not 
residents-of a moral claim to democratic voice. 
While seeking to refute Dahl's moral-rights proof for 
workplace democracy, it is not my intention to contest his 
argument about its benefits. I am in fact sympathetic to arguments 
about the desirability of workplace democracy, although I am also 
skeptical that the wholesale democratization of work would be 
as unambiguously beneficial as Dahl and other advocates claim.4 
The point, however, is that I agree that desirability is the proper 
ground upon which the issue should be decided. If the demos is 
4. For examples of consequentialist justifications for workplace democracy 
see Herbert Croly, Progressive Democracy (New York: Macmillan, 1914), chap. 18; 
Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1970); Edward Greenberg, Workplace D mocracy: The Political Effects 
of Participation (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986); David Schweickart, Against 
Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Samuel Bowles and 
Herbert Gintis, "A Political and Economic Case for the Democratic Enterprise," in 
The Idea of Democracy, ed. David Copp, Jean Hampton, and John Roemer 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 375-99; and Christopher 
McMahon, Authority and Democracy: A General Theory of Government and Management 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). 
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persuaded that democratizing work is clearly advantageous, it 
should be entitled to mandate that reform because no moral rights 
are at stake. Conversely, if the demos is not convinced about the 
benefits of political equality at work, it should not be compelled 
to make the change in the name of protecting an alleged moral 
right. Within the firm, unlike the polity, the question of how power 
should be distributed cannot be resolved by appeal to the moral 
rights of the individual. It is a matter of discretion, and should be 
decided by a consequentialist calculation of the relative benefits. 
On the question of democratizing work, I believe, democratic 
deliberation should not be trumped by inflated rights-claims. 
Dahi's Proof 
Dahl's proof for the existence of a moral right to workplace 
democracy forms one part of his general theory of procedural 
democracy. Although first stated in several essays published in 
the late 1970s,5 it received its fullest exposition in A Preface to 
Economic Democracy. In this section I explain Dahl's proof as set 
forth in that work. 
A Preface to Economic Democracy makes both a moral-rights 
and a consequentialist argument for workplace democracy. If we 
disentangle the two, Dahl's proof for the existence of the right 
consists of three steps. The first specifies the conditions that must 
exist in an association in order to validate the claim to an equal 
share of power. The second step demonstrates that all of these 
conditions apply to economic associations. The third step 
addresses the objection that the moral right to workplace 
democracy violates another alleged moral right, that of owners to 
manage their property as they see fit. 
5. "On Removing Certain Impediments to Democracy," pp. 10-12; and 
"Procedural Democracy," in Philosophy, Politics and Society, fifth series, ed. Peter 
Laslett and James Fishkin (New Haven: YaleUniversity Press, 1979), pp. 97-133. 
For criticism of Dahl's theory of procedural democracy and his replies see Phillip 
Green and Robert Dahl, "What Is Political Equality?: A Controversy," Dissent 26 
(1979): 351-68; Richard Krouse, "Capitalism, Socialism, and Political Equality," 
Dissent 27 (1980): 453-56; Robert Dahl, "A Reply to Richard Krouse," Dissent 27 
(1980): 456-58; and Augustus DiZerega, "Equality, Self-Government and 
Democracy: A Critique of Dahl's Political Equality," Western Political Quarterly 41 
(1988): 447-68. 
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Among advocates of workplace democracy, two different 
strategies have been employed in order to prove that democratic 
voice is a moral right of labor: some theorists make autonomy 
arguments, while others appeal to a principle of distributive 
justice. The argument from autonomy claims that voice in the firm 
is an instantiation of the moral right to autonomy all individuals 
possess.6 Distributive justice arguments, by contrast, attempt to 
show that an equal share of power in the firm is an entitlement of 
all who are subject to its rules.7 In the first step of his proof, Dahl 
develops an argument of the latter sort.8 
Dahl's distributive justice proof is a variation of an argument 
first set forth by Carl Cohen thirty ears ago. In a chapter on the 
justification of democracy, Cohen observed that the right to an 
equal share of power in an association can be deduced from two 
premises: "first, that equals should be treated equally; and second, 
that all members of that community are equal in the respect(s) 
properly relevant to the allocation of the right to participate in 
government."' The first premise is widely accepted but the second 
requires that members be equal with regard to stake and standing 
in the association in order to deserve equal voice in its governance. 
If both conditions hold, then democratic power is owed to 
members as a matter of distributive justice. 
Dahl's list of the criteria entitling one to democratic voice in 
an association is essentially a more elaborate variation of Cohen's 
argument. In its first version, Dahl listed only two criteria that 
must exist in order to claim the right: first, that "there is a need 
for collective decisions that are binding on the members of the 
association"; and second, that the "members are roughly equally 
qualified, taken all around."" Later versions of the argument 
6. For examples of the autonomy argument see Patricia Werhane, Persons, 
Rights, and Corporations (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1985), pp. 133-35; Carol 
Gould, Rethinking Democracy (Cambidge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 
84-85, 143; and James Hyland, Democratic Theory: The Philosophical Foundations 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), pp. 231-33. 
7. For an example of the distributive justice argument see Michael Walzer, 
Spheres ofJustice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York: Basic Books, 1983), 
pp. 291-303. For a critique of Walzer's argument see Robert Mayer, "Michael Walzer, 
Industrial Democracy, and Complex Equality," Political Theory 29 (2001): 237-61. 
8. Dahl, Preface to Economic Democracy, p. 85. 
9. Carl Cohen, Democracy (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1971), p. 244. 
10. Dahl, "On Removing Certain Impediments to Democracy," pp. 10-12. 
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extended the list of criteria to seven, four of which concern the 
nature of the association and three the members who compose it. 
As Dahl puts it in A Preface to Economic Democracy, "the validity of 
a claim to this right rests on certain assumptions about the nature 
of a democratic association and the people in it.""' The 
assumptions are (1) that the association's rules are "binding on 
all members of the collectivity"; (2) that there is a deliberative 
process before rules are adopted; (3) that "binding collective 
decisions ought to be made only by persons who-are subject to 
decisions"; (4) that "the good of each person is entitled to equal 
consideration"; (5) that "each adult person in the association is 
entitled to be the final judge of his or her own interests"; (6) that 
"all the adult members of the association...are roughly equally 
well qualified to decide which matters do or do not require binding 
collective decisions"; and (7) that "when the claims of different 
persons to a scarce and valued thing are equally valid, and no 
person's claim is better or worse than any other's, then if the thing 
is appropriately divisible into equal shares (as, for example, votes 
can be divided), each equally qualified claimant is entitled to an 
equal share."12 
A moment's reflection reveals that the seventh item on Dahl's 
list corresponds to Cohen's first premise (that equals should be 
treated equally), while the other six specify the kinds of equal 
stake and standing that underwrite a democratic distribution of 
power (Cohen's second premise). Dahl's argument is that the 
seven items are an exhaustive list of the conditions necessary and 
sufficient o sustain a claim to an equal share of power in an 
association. The proof is conditional, taking an if-then form, but 
Dahl insists that "in any association for which the assumptions 
are valid, the members possess an inalienable right to govern 
themselves by means of the democratic process, whether or not 
they choose to exercise that right."13 
Given the number of assumptions upon which the 
conclusion rests, it is easy to miss the underlying force of this 
proof. Its gist, however, can be simply stated: if equals should 
be treated equally, and members of a group are indeed equal in 
11. Dahl, Preface to Economic Democracy, p. 57. 
12. Ibid., pp. 57-58. 
13. Ibid., p. 61. 
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all relevant respects, then each is entitled as a matter of right to 
an equal share of power in the association. Like a geometric 
proof, the conclusion follows logically from the premises. As 
Cohen notes, if these conditions hold for an association, then 
"we have no rational way to justify any preference being given 
to some over others; upon him who would give such preference 
lies the obligation to justify such preference."14 
Having specified the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
the entitlement o democratic voice, the second step in Dahl's 
argument is to show that all seven assumptions hold for economic 
associations. Dahl takes it for granted that the seven do hold for 
political associations, which means that residents of a polity 
possess a moral right to political equality. What Dahl must now 
prove is that employees are the moral equivalent of residents, a
step Richard Arneson dubs "the parallel case argument."" By 
analogy, Dahl claims that the citizen is to a polity as the employee 
is to a firm. Hence, "if democracy is justified in governing the 
state, then it must also be justified in governing economic 
enterprises; and to say that it is not justified in governing economic 
enterprises is to imply that it is not justified in governing the state.""6 
Of the seven items enumerated in the first step, Dahl argues 
that only two are open to serious challenge as inapplicable in the 
firm: conditions one and six. The first assumption holds that for 
democracy to be an entitlement of members, they must be subject 
to binding decisions by the association. After all, if the decisions 
will not be enforced in any way, it does not really matter whether 
I have a say in them or not. Dahl notes that some may question 
the parallel case here because a firm's rules are not binding in the 
same way as the laws of a polity. "Unlike citizens of a state, one 
might object, workers are not compelled to obey managerial 
decisions; their decision to do so is voluntary."17 The state claims 
a monopoly over the legitimate means of violence within a 
territory and uses that coercive power to enforce its laws, whereas 
the firm does not. A business can only fire me if I break its rules, 
14. Cohen, Democracy, p. 245. 
15. Richard Ameson, "Democratic Rights at National and Workplace Levels," 
in Copp, Idea of Democracy, p. 138. 
16. Dahl, Preface to Economic Democracy, p. 111. 
17. Ibid., p. 114. 
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but the state can throw me in jail or even take my life, and this 
difference might suggest that the decisions of an economic 
association are not sufficiently binding to justify a right to 
democratic voice in their formulation. 
Dahl counters, however, that this distinction is not relevant 
to the assumption in question. Decisions of an association are 
binding even if not coercively enforced as long as "severe 
sanctions" are imposed for noncompliance. The fact that a firm 
can fire me for disobedience, thus depriving me temporarily of a 
livelihood, is a serious enough sanction to render my decision to 
obey less than fully voluntary. Termination of membership is an 
exercise of power, and Dahl's point is that when power is exercised 
by associations over subjects, and the members are equals, then 
each has a right to an equal say in how that power is exercised. 
"Like a state, then, a firm can also be viewed as a political system 
in which relations of power exist between governments and the 
governed. If so, is it not appropriate to insist that the relationship 
between governors and governed should satisfy the criteria of 
the democratic process-as we properly insist in the domain of 
the state?""8 
The sixth condition of the entitlement argument holds that 
the members must be equally qualified to make judgments about 
how the association should be run. In many respects this is the 
decisive premise of the argument for democracy, for if some are 
manifestly better able to discern the common good than others, it 
is not clear why the rest would be entitled to an equal share of 
power in the association. This seems to have been one of Plato's 
objections to democracy, for instance. Dahl recognizes that a mod- 
ern-day, corporate-capitalist Plato might contest the parallel case 
on precisely this score, arguing that stockholders and the manag- 
ers they appoint are better qualified to make business decisions 
for the long-term good of the firm than rank-and-file employees."9 
Dahl replies to this objection by appealing to the conclusions 
of empirical and theoretical economics. He notes that according 
to rational-choice theory, labor should care at least as much about 
the long-term good of the business as owners or managers since 
labor's exit options are usually more constrained: 
18. Ibid., p. 115. 
19. Ibid., pp. 116-17. 
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the losses incurred by workers from the decline of a firm are normally 
even greater than those investors suffer; for it is ordinarily much easier 
and less costly in human terms for a well-heeled investor to switch in 
and out of the securities market than for aworker to switch in and out 
of the labor market. Amoderately foresightful worker would therefore 
be as greatly concerned with long-run efficiencies as a rational investor 
or a rational manager, and perhaps more so.20 
This theoretical prediction is confirmed by the actual behavior of 
worker-managed cooperatives. Dahl cites a number of empirical 
studies that conclude democratic firms do make rational economic 
decisions and are capable of saving and investing for the sake of 
long-term performance.21 Thus, the strong principle of equality 
does seem to be a plausible assumption. What is more, if the critics 
are right that employees are not qualified to manage their firms, 
then it surely follows that citizens are even less qualified to govern 
the state, given that employees almost always know more about 
the business for which they work than citizens do about public 
affairs. Most opponents of workplace democracy are not willing 
to go that far, however, for it would cost them the vote they cherish 
in the state. In the end Dahl reminds his readers that "the strong 
principle of equality does not require that citizens be equally 
competent in every respect. It is sufficient to believe that citizens 
are qualified enough to decide which matters do or do not require 
binding collective decisions...and on matters they do not feel 
competent to decide for themselves, [that] they are qualified to set 
the terms on which they will delegate these decisions to others."22 
Having refuted these objections, Dahl maintains that the 
analogy between firm and polity holds, and that all seven 
assumptions underwriting the entitlement o democratic voice 
apply in full to economic associations. The last step in the 
argument is to show that the moral right to workplace democracy 
is not trumped by the claims of a superior moral right. The one 
candidate that might play this role is the right to property, which 
some allege would be violated if labor gains equal voice in the 
management of the firm. In a democratic workplace owners could 
20. Ibid., p. 123. 
21. Ibid., pp. 122-33. For further evidence on the performance of cooperative 
enterprise see Schweickart, Against Capitalism, pp. 88-136. 
22. Ibid., p. 118. 
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no longer boss employees around; indeed, it seems that 
employees would now be in a position to boss around owners 
and their physical assets, thus infringing on the rightful 
entailments of property. 
Dahl denies, however, that the right to property is in fact a 
moral right at all.23 While granting that individuals do possess a 
moral right to economic liberty, he rejects the claim that the right 
to property is a direct instantiation of that moral right. The 
derivation of the right to property from the right to liberty involves 
a series of non sequiturs, and this suggests that ownership is a 
conventional right subject to democratic deliberation and 
redefinition. If in their current form property rights conflict with 
the right to workplace democracy, they must give way in order to 
preserve the inviolability of moral rights. In economic associations 
it is democracy that is trumps, not the ownership of assets, because 
power over people is morally non-negotiable. 
With this argument Dahl claims that the moral right of labor 
to self-government has been sustained. The denial of democratic 
voice to employees in the workplace is therefore an injustice, a 
violation of the inalienable rights of the individual. The fact that 
it is sanctioned today by majority rule and majority opinion is no 
justification, for moral rights cannot legitimately be suspended 
by a show of hands. Though Dahl devotes the first chapter of A 
Preface to Economic Democracy to a refutation of Tocqueville's claim 
that democracies are given to majority tyranny,24 the remainder of 
the book seems to prove that the tyranny of the majority is in fact 
pervasive where economic rights are concerned. Democratic 
citizens, the majority of whom are also employees of authoritarian 
firms, for some reason refuse to enforce the moral right they 
possess as individuals to political equality at work. 
Flawed Refutations 
Despite Dahl's stature as the premier democratic theorist in 
the postwar era, surprisingly little attention has been devoted 
to his proof for the existence of a moral right to workplace de- 
23. Ibid., pp. 73-83. 
24. Ibid., pp. 7-51. 
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mocracy. Most of the reviews of A Preface to Economic Democracy 
passed over the issue in silence. Nonetheless, if one scours the 
literature one can find two different grounds upon which Dahl's 
argument has been challenged, but in my view neither of these 
refutations ucceeds. 
One objection is directed against the third step in Dahl's proof, 
on the relative inferiority of property rights. Jan Narveson, a noted 
libertarian philosopher, insists against Dahl that there is a moral 
right to private property and that it does trump the putative right 
to democratic voice at work.2 One would expect nothing less from 
a libertarian. The issues here are thorny, but fortunately we can 
spare ourselves the trouble of entering the thicket of property rights 
in which both Dahl and Narveson become entangled if we 
recognize at the outset that ownership of physical assets by itself 
never entails power to direct the labor of others, which is the 
question at hand. As Christopher McMahon observes, 
Central to ownership is the right to exclude others from contact with 
an item. Ownership thus gives the owner of an item the right to control 
the uses to which others put it in the sense that he may veto any use of 
it proposed by someone else. But it does not give him any right to tell 
anyone to put that property to the use that he wants. It is not a right to 
command labor.26 
Ownership by itself is not a sufficient moral license to confer 
authority on managers. Hence the fact that employers own all of 
the physical assets of a business does not entitle them to boss 
labor around. Conversely, a democratic reorganization of the 
enterprise would not confer power on labor to use another's 
property without the owner's consent. For this reason democratic 
rights and property rights are capable of peaceful coexistence, 
without the need to establish a hierarchy between them, since the 
one is concerned with power over people and the other with power 
over things. In an economic democracy owners could keep their 
property and workers would retain their voice, and their 
interactions in the marketplace would be governed by contract. 
Instead of capital hiring labor, in a democratic economy labor will 
25. Jan Narveson, "Democracy and Economic Rights," Social Philosophy and 
Policy 9 (1992): 45-49. 
26. McMahon, Authority and Democracy, p. 15. 
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hire capital, leasing it at interest from owners, but owners might 
remain free to keep their property if they do not wish to put it to 
productive use.27 
It is important to recognize, then, that the democratization of 
work need not entail the expropriation of any physical assets of 
owners. Dahl, certainly, cannot be portrayed as a bloodthirsty 
communist bent on expropriating the expropriators. What he 
wants to take from capital is not the right to control property but 
the power to command labor. To be sure, loss of this power does 
involve a kind of expropriation, but the victim of this "takings" is 
not capital but labor itself. When democracy at work is mandated, 
labor loses the right to sell voice in exchange for a job. Capital 
thereby loses the right to buy voice, but it is from labor that this 
asset is actually taken. If we think of voice as personal property, 
then it is true that workplace democracy conflicts with property 
rights, but the conflict is quite different from the one about which 
Dahl and Narveson disagree. 
As a libertarian, Narveson is still likely to object to the 
expropriation of labor's right to sell voice to capital, but then again 
some libertarians also complain about preventing labor from 
selling itself into slavery28 To a libertarian virtually everything is 
property, while inalienable rights are usually just an illegitimate 
restraint on free trade. For the rest of us, however, the loss of the 
right to treat our personal iberty as a marketable asset might seem 
like a gain, and the same could be said for the loss of the right to 
sell voice. At the very least it is important to recognize that the 
real conflict between property rights and democratic rights is 
different from the one Dahl and Narveson debate, and that step 
three in Dahl's proof is either unnecessary or must be 
reformulated. Denying moral status to property rights is less likely 
to be convincing once we learn that the "property" in question is 
voice and not merely physical assets. 
The second objection to the validity of Dahl's proof is leveled 
against the first step, which sets forth the criteria necessary and 
27. On labor hiring capital in economic democracy see David Ellerman, The 
Democratic Worker-Owned Firm (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990), p. 64. 
28. On the libertarian justification for self-enslavement see Robert Nozick, 
Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), p. 331; and J. Philmore, 
"The Libertarian Case for Slavery," The Philosophical Forum 14 (1982): 43-58. 
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sufficient o claim an equal share of power in an association. 
Richard Arneson. argues in effect that if we specify the first 
condition in Dahl's list more carefully, the parallel case fails 
because that condition is not usually met by economic 
associations. The condition in question concerns the existence of 
binding decisions, an assumption Dahl recognized might be 
contested by opponents. Arneson points to "the differential 
voluntariness of the individual's relationship to politics and to 
work," which he insists "strongly conditions the force of the 
individual's claim to a democratic say in each area." If one's 
subjection to power is voluntary, he argues, then there is no 
entitlement to democratic voice. Arneson measures the 
voluntariness of subjection, however, by the existence of exit 
options in the form of other economic or political associations to 
which one could feasibly move. The claim is that "the presence of 
significant exit options can weaken the parallel case argument." 
If I could go elsewhere but decide to stay, then my subjection to 
authoritarian power in an association is voluntary. Hence I am 
not entitled to political equality in it since I voluntarily submit to 
powerlessness. Arneson's conclusion is that "having options and 
enjoying democratic rights may be substitutes for one another."29 
In a market economy labor usually has multiple employment 
opportunities. This is especially true in the labor-scarce economy 
of the past year, but it also holds in leaner times. It remains true 
even in the academic job market, despite the glut of labor. Though 
tenure makes many a professor feel like a serf, attached for life to 
the institution that granted it, the fact is that academics have other 
feasible employment opportunities of which they could avail 
themselves. I could quit my job tomorrow and become an adjunct 
instructor at three or four community colleges, or try to get a job 
teaching high school, or go into business as a freelance writer, or 
apply at McDonald's, and so on. I do not do so because my current 
job seems the best of the available options, but the existence of 
alternatives cannot be denied. This is Arneson's point: if I have 
options but nonetheless choose to stay put, my submission to 
powerlessness is voluntary and I cannot therefore complain that 
an injustice has been done to me. Though I might like my current 
job plus democratic voice to boot, I have not been wronged if no 
29.Arneson, "Democratic Rights at National and Workplace Levels," pp. 138-43. 
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employer offers it to me, any more than I have been wronged 
because no employer is willing to pay me a six-figure income for 
the skills I have to offer. The case would be different if I had no 
realistic options and so was forced to obey authoritarian power 
for want of an alternative. Then voice would be my right since 
subjection is no longer unambiguously voluntary. Arneson notes 
that this is usually the situation of citizens in the nation-state, 
where exit from the association is much more costly than in the 
labor market. It is for this reason that citizens but not employees 
are usually entitled to democratic voice: "The right to a democratic 
say in the domain of politics is meant to ensure that those 
consequences one cannot avoid will be tolerable overall and in 
the long run.""30 
Despite this criticism we should note that Arneson does not 
so much refute Dahl's parallel case as reformulate it; in essence 
he rewrites the first assumption in such a way that it can still 
hold good in both polity and firm, though less frequently than 
Dahl claims. According to Arneson's revised version, the first 
assumption now states that the rules are binding if the exit options 
of members are sharply constrained. As Arneson himself admits, 
this could conceivably be true in the labor market, for example in 
an isolated one-company town.31 Because exit is costly in this case, 
labor would have a valid claim to a democratic share of power in 
the firm. Conversely, the assumption might not be met in an 
authoritarian polity if significant exit options exist. Arneson gives 
the example of two neighboring countries with a common culture 
from which exit is easy: "If one land is an autocracy and the other 
is a democracy, the fact that citizens in the autocracy have the 
low-cost option of moving to the democratic sister nation 
substantially lessens the argument that citizens of both lands have 
democratic citizenship rights that the autocratic order 
systematically violates."32 And that example is not purely 
hypothetical: it holds for the great majority of local governments 
in America, from which exit is often easier than from one's job. If 
Arneson is right, most residents of local polities do not have a 
moral right to democratic voice since they can always move if 
they do not like the local dictatorship. 
30. Ibid., p. 140. 
31. Ibid. 
32. Ibid. 
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But this surprising conclusion should suggest to us that 
something is wrong with Arneson's restatement of the parallel 
case. My intuitions tell me that I am entitled to democratic voice 
in local government even if my exit options are great.33 The fact 
that I could easily move someplace else does not seem relevant 
to the entitlement, for municipalities as much as nation-states 
enforce rules against me. What is more, Dahl himself objects that 
the exit argument "exaggerates the differences between a 
worker's subjection to decisions made by the government of a 
firm and a citizen's subjection to decisions made by the govern- 
ment of the state." With regard to both types of associations, 
Dahl asks, "is not 'exit' (or exile) often so costly, in every sense, 
that membership is for all practical purposes compulsory?" 
Arneson rests his case on the existence of formal exit options, 
but Dahl points out that substantively these options are often 
hollow. He concludes that "because exit is so costly, member- 
ship in a firm is not significantly more voluntary or less 
compulsory than citizenship in a municipality or perhaps even 
in a country,"34 and I am willing to concede the point to him. 
Although I do believe that Arneson is on the right track when 
he claims that the bindingness of rules is relevant to the distri- 
bution of power within associations, he errs in judging the extent 
of bindingness by the exit options of members. 
The bindingness of rules, however, can be measured in 
another way. Ease of exit is one dimension, but a second 
overlooked by Dahl and Arneson alike concerns entrance into 
the association-for rules are binding not only if one lacks an 
exit option but also if one lacks the option not to be subject to the 
association in the first place. In other words, the manner in which 
subjection to rules is acquired conditions one's entitlement o 
voice in an association, and it is this circumstance rather than 
the presence of an exit option that undercuts the parallel case. 
Subjection is acquired in different ways in firms and polities, I 
will show in the following sections, and this difference 
invalidates the entitlement o political equality in firms as a 
matter of distributive justice. 
33. The reasoning that underlies this intuition will be set forth in the next section. 
34. Dahl, Preface to Economic Democracy, pp. 114-16. 
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Acquiring Subjection 
Generally speaking, subjection to the rules of an association 
can be acquired in one of two ways: either the subjection is optional 
or it is required. In the former case we say that individuals possess 
a "subjection option," which means that refusal to submit to the 
association leaves one free from subjection to its rules. Where 
subjection is optional one must join the association before its rules 
become binding. In associations in which subjection is required, 
by contrast, a subjection option is lacking. Here members do not 
join in order to become subject to the rules but are conscripted by 
the association. Subjection is imposed regardless of choice such 
that members are not merely subjects but are also subjected. They 
suffer an imposition initiated by the association.3" 
Now it is my claim that the presence of an exit option does 
not condition one's entitlement to voice in an association but the 
presence of a subjection option does. The first assumption in Dahl's 
seven-point list, on the bindingness of rules, should therefore read 
that a subjection option is lacking. Where subjection is required 
the proof holds, for ifan association imposes rules on me regardless 
of choice, and equals must be treated equally, and we are equal in 
the relevant respects, then I have a moral right to an equal share 
of power in the association. The entitlement arises precisely from 
the fact that others first staked a claim to power over me but have 
no better claim to this power than I do. If power there must be, 
and equals must be treated equally, then an equal share of that 
power is my right. Those who initiated my subjection have no 
superior claim to the power, and we are therefore obliged to share 
this "common good" equally. 
But if not, then not. Where prospective members possess a 
subjection option their subjection to the rules is not imposed 
35. Throughout this section I avoid the language of "voluntariness" in 
describing organizations that accord a subjection option to prospective members. 
In their criticisms of Dahl's proof both Narveson and Arneson employ this 
terminology, but they fail to distinguish carefully between the different ways in 
which organizations can be voluntary. Freedom to leave is one dimension of 
voluntariness, but freedom not to be subject to the organization is another. We 
would do better to avoid this language entirely and focus on the kinds of options 
organizations accord to members. For reasons that will become clear in the next 
section, I also avoid the contested language of consent in building my argument. 
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regardless of choice. They have an option to be a member or not, 
to join if the association will have them, and this means that the 
rules of the association do not bind in the same way where the 
option is lacking. Associations that recognize a subjection option 
on the part of prospective members do not conscript subjects but 
recruit volunteers. They make an offer, one element of which might 
be voicelessness in the governance of the association, but the 
voicelessness is not imposed without the option to refuse 
subjection. The terms of subjection are negotiated, and while the 
resulting distribution of voice may be unequal, that distribution 
does not violate the principle of justice upon which Dahl's proof 
is premised. That principle is not equal outcomes per se but equal 
treatment of equals, which is consistent with inequalities of voice 
in an association as long as subjection to the rules is authentically 
optional. Presumably associations that make unequal voice a 
condition of membership must offer some kind of compensation 
in return in order to attract subjects.36 Where a minimum degree 
of compensation is lacking we have reason to doubt the existence 
of a subjection option (an issue to which we will return in the 
next section), but where that minimum standard is met an unequal 
share of voice is not an injustice to members given the seventh 
assumption in Dahl's proof. It could only be so if equal outcomes 
are mandated from the start, but if that is the principle of fairness 
upon which the right to workplace democracy is predicated then 
the other six assumptions would be unnecessary. Dahl, however, 
is not a "simple egalitarian," to employ Michael Walzer's 
terminology,"7 and it therefore follows from Dahl's own logic that 
voice is not an entitlement of members where a subjection option 
exists. Such members are not required to join or obey the rules, 
36. The claim to political equality in an organization can be a valuable asset. 
Capitalist firms purchase the claim (negotiate political inequality) because they 
think they can maximize profits by dictating how the work will be done. Whether 
an authoritarian political structure in the firm in fact enhances profitability is a 
contested issue. If it does, then expropriation of this claim (by mandating workplace 
democracy in every firm) should result in diminshed compensation for labor. For 
two arguments along these lines see Ian Maitland, "Rights in the Workplace: A 
Nozickian Argument," Journal of Business Ethics 8 (1989): 951-54; and Michael 
Phillips, "Should We Let Employees Contract away Their Rights againstArbitrary 
Discharge?" Journal of Business Ethics 13 (1994): 233-42. 
37. Walzer, Spheres of Justice, p. xii. 
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and this means that the unequal voice they accept in entering the 
association cannot be construed as an injustice done to them. 
A set of examples will illustrate the relevance of this distinction 
for the entitlement o equal voice in various associations. Take, 
first, the case of polities. Given my specification of the first 
assumption in Dahl's list, adult residents of territorial ssociations 
do possess a moral right to political equality. This is because 
residents are essentially conscripted by territorial ssociations and 
required to obey the rules regardless of choice. The myth of the 
social contract notwithstanding, polities do not ask residents 
whether they want to obey before subjection is imposed within a 
territory. Governments impose first and ask for consent later-if 
indeed they ever do. The power is simply claimed, but the rulers 
who claim sovereignty are no better than the adult residents 
subjected to it. Unless the power is shared equally, therefore, quals 
will not be treated equally. The norm of equality that governs the 
distribution will be violated, and an injustice done to voiceless 
subjects. Political equality is precisely the compensation equals 
are owed for the imposition of subjection. 
But what of immigrants? Don't prospective newcomers to a 
territorial ssociation possess a subjection option that would rob 
them of the entitlement to voice as a matter of distributive justice? 
If so, it seems that polities could legitimately require consent to 
voicelessness as a condition for admission to the territory. The 
result would be an unequal system of membership, in which 
native residents are full-fledged citizens while immigrant residents 
are merely subjects. This is the logic of guest-worker laws, which 
require some groups of newcomers to trade the claim to voice for 
the right of admission into the territory governed by the polity. 
The existence of a subjection option for prospective 
immigrants, however, is an illusion-one that polities all too often 
foster in order to exploit vulnerable newcomers. It is an illusion 
because it mistakes entering a jurisdiction for joining an 
association or common enterprise.38 Immigrants do make a choice 
to change location, but moving is not the same as joining. When I 
38. Consider the fruitful distinction drawn by Michael Oakeshott between 
civil and enterprise associations in On Human Conduct (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1975), ch. 2. Polities are not enterprise associations, but they sometimes like to act 
as if they were. 
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move from one residence to another in a different jurisdiction I 
am not given an option not to be subjected to that new jurisdiction, 
and it is precisely this choice that constitutes a subjection option. 
While nation-states may be entitled to block entry of aliens, we 
should not confuse permission to enter with bestowal of a 
subjection option that undercuts the entitlement o voice. Once 
some reasonable probationary period has elapsed, such that 
newcomers can be recognized as residents and not merely tourists 
or transients, immigrants (including guest-workers) must be 
accorded the same share of power enjoyed by natives. Equals must 
be treated equally, for what matters in polities is not the nativity 
of one's residency but the fact of subjection and its imposition 
regardless of choice. Natives of a territory are not given a choice 
by the polity about whether to be subjected or not, and so to appeal 
to the principle of choice for this subset of residents (immigrants) 
is an injustice given the norm of equal treatment and the 
assumption of equal competence.39 
Another example that illustrates the relevance of conscription 
or imposed subjection to the entitlement o democratic voice is 
unionization in the closed shop. When membership in a union is 
required as a condition of employment a subjection option is 
lacking and the members are therefore entitled to self-government. 
Subjection to the rules, including the payment of dues, is imposed, 
and voice is the compensation owed for this imposition. The fact 
that one could avoid subjection by not taking the job is irrelevant 
to the entitlement, for membership in the firm and in the union 
must be distinguished. In accepting employment I am 
automatically conscripted by the union regardless of choice, and 
since it initiates the subjection I am entitled to an equal share of 
the power in return. This type of organization does not have the 
discretion to withhold voice from me. 
But other types of associations, even if they consist of equally 
competent individuals, do possess such discretion because they 
accord a subjection option to prospective members. Consider a 
classic example: a monastic institution. Monasteries, at least in 
the Catholic tradition, are not democratic organizations. Superiors 
are not chosen by those subject to the discipline, who in some 
39. For a similar argument against guest-worker laws see Walzer, Spheres of 
Justice, pp. 56-61. 
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orders are literally voiceless. Most people seem to believe that 
there is nothing intrinsically unfair about this radically unequal 
distribution of power and that initiates do not possess a moral 
right to political equality in the organization. But if we apply Dahl's 
version of the seven-point list to this case we might be forced to 
conclude against our intuitions that such a right does exist, even 
if members choose not to claim it. As in the case of the firm, only 
assumptions one and six might be contested.4 Regarding the latter, 
a conservative reading of Catholic theology might cast doubt on 
the strong principle of equality, but there is empirical evidence 
that laymen can govern religious organizations perfectly well- 
witness the Quakers. And with regard to binding decisions, if 
difficulty of exit is the standard by which bindingness is measured 
then it seems plausible to conclude that the rules are binding since 
exit from the monastery is likely to be more difficult han exit 
from a firm, let alone a municipality. If so, monasteries ought to 
be democratic, but that is a conclusion most of us would reject. 
And the reason we reject it is precisely because initiates possess a 
subjection option that deprives them of the entitlement to voice. 
Novices opt to join an organization which they know is governed 
in an authoritarian fashion, and that option decisively conditions 
their entitlements. Subjection is not imposed regardless of choice, 
and thus voice is not owed as compensation for the subjection 
that is acquired. 
The same logic applies even more straightforwardly to private 
clubs, where equal competence is widely assumed. Clubs do not 
have to be democratic, even in a democratic society. Founders are 
free to craft the governance structure they deem best, and new 
members have no moral right to require political equality where 
it does not exist as long as they have been accorded a subjection 
option. Once members are admitted they may press for democratic 
rights, but no fundamental injustice is done to them if equal voice 
is not granted. In organizations of this sort distributive justice does 
not dictate howv power should be divided because subjection to 
the rules is not required. 
40. In the example we abstract from the circumstance that the monastery 
belongs to a larger organization (the Church) that may be entitled to choose the 
superiors. Assume for the sake of argument that the monastery is autonomous. 
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Having now identified the crucial assumption upon which 
the entitlement to political equality must be premised in order to 
be valid, we are now in a position to return to the parallel case. 
With Dahl I agree that equal voice is owed to adult residents of 
territorial ssociations as a matter of distributive justice. But do 
employees have the same entitlement? Are they also denied a 
subjection option? 
The Exploitation Objection 
On the face of it the answer seems easy: the parallel case fails 
because the typical employee does possess a subjection option. 
Unlike residents, employees are not conscripted, and for this 
reason they lack the moral right to political equality despite the 
other ways in which the two types of associations are equivalent. 
Only slaves and serfs would have a valid claim to democratic 
voice, but the position of labor in a capitalist market economy is 
qualitatively different because labor is not subjected to 
management regardless of choice. 
The conclusion is drawn too quickly, however, for there is a 
familiar objection that challenges the existence of a meaningful 
subjection option for wage-labor in a capitalist economy. 
According to this view, the propertylessness of most workers and 
their dependence on capital for employment makes subjection in 
the firm a virtual requirement for the majority.41 While the labor 
market creates the appearance of choice, in the sense that one may 
apply to many different employers or even go into business for 
oneself, only a relative few have a realistic option of avoiding 
subjection to some capitalist firm or other. Given the intensity of 
competition and the advantages enjoyed by large-scale capitalist 
41. The classic locus for this argument is, of course, Marx's Capital. At the end 
of the chapter on the working day, for instance, Marx observes that "our worker 
emerges from the process of production looking different from when he entered it. 
In the market, as the owner of the commodity 'labor-power,' he stood face to face 
with other owners of commodities, one owner against another owner. The contract 
by which he sold his labor-power to the capitalist proved in black and white, so to 
speak, that he was free to dispose of himself. But when the transaction was concluded, 
it was discovered that he was no 'free agent,' that the period of time for which he is 
free to sell his labor-power is the period of time for which he is forced to sell it" 
(Capital: Volume One, trans. Ben Fowkes [New York: Vintage Books, 1977], p. 415). 
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enterprise, opportunities for self-employment are sharply 
constrained. As a result, we might conclude that wage-labor is 
effectively conscripted by capital, not individually but as a class. 
As G. A. Cohen explains, "since the freedom of each [proletarian] 
is contingent on others not exercising their similarly contingent 
freedom, we can say that there is a great deal of unfreedom in 
their situation. Though each is individually free to leave, [each] 
suffers with the rest from...collective unfreedom."42 
If empirically accurate as a description of the plight of wage- 
labor this objection is valid, for exploited labor does lack a 
meaningful subjection option. A libertarian might challenge the 
very possibility of exploitation in a capitalist market,43 but I will 
acknowledge the force of the objection because I agree that 
exploitation renders the appearance of choice illusory.44 
Nonetheless, even if we grant the objection it does not follow that 
exploited labor in a capitalist economy possesses a moral right to 
workplace democracy. A different conclusion is required by the 
logic of the objection. 
In order to see this we must distinguish between two different 
meanings of the claim that subjection is required. According to 
the first version (required,), subjection occurs regardless of choice. 
Jurisdiction is simply claimed, such that subjects are effectively 
conscripts. It is my argument that subjection to polities is required 
in this sense. But subjection can be required in a different way 
(required2), if one formally possesses options but substantively 
the options are hollow. In this case subjection is acquiesced to 
because circumstances are such that subjection is the only viable 
(or the least bad) alternative. Here exploitation takes the place of 
coercion in rendering individuals subject to rules and decisions.45 
42. G. A. Cohen, "The Structure of Proletarian Unfreedom," Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 12 (1982): 11. 
43. For the libertarian objection see Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, pp. 250-65. 
44. On the theory of exploitation see David Zimmerman, "Coercive Wage 
Offers," Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (1982): 121-45; John Roemer, A General 
Theory of Exploitation and Class (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982); and 
Allen Wood, "Exploitation," Social Philosophy and Policy 12 (1995): 136-58. 
45. According to Marx, expropriation of the direct producers results in the 
formation of "grouped masses of men who have nothing to sell but their labor- 
power" and "are compelled to sell themselves voluntarily....The silent compulsion 
of economic relations ets the seal on the domination of the capitalist over the 
worker" (Capital, p. 899). 
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Now if subjection to capitalist management on the part of 
wage-labor is required2, a moment's reflection suggests that the 
appropriate redress for this imposition is not in fact an equal share 
of voice in the firm but rather the restoration of choice that has 
been unjustly constrained. If consent to subjection has been 
rendered hollow through the reduction of effective options, the 
proper remedy for this loss is to make consent robust again by 
enhancing labor's choices.According to the exploitation objection, 
labor loses its options because it is propertyless and thus 
compelled to accept disadvantageous offers under the pressure 
of necessity. In order to prevent exploitation workers above all 
need their own property, or at least guaranteed subsistence such 
that they never feel compelled to accept just any offer, no matter 
how bad. The proper cure for exploitation, then, is not workplace 
democracy but a generous welfare state, or, more radically, 
redistribution of property. 
Indeed, mandating a right to workplace democracy in this 
situation will not end exploitation, as John Roemer demonstrates. 
Even if capital is not permitted to hire labor, so that all firms are 
self-governing labor collectives, exploitation in the Marxian sense 
will still occur if labor is propertyless. This is because capital can 
exploit its advantageous position in the credit market to extract 
exorbitant interest payments when it loans capital to labor. With 
regard to the exploitativeness of an economy, "it does not matter 
whether capital hires labor or labor hires capital." Credit-market 
capitalism can be as exploitative as labor-market capitalism, which 
again suggests that democracy itself is not the cure for exploitation. 
This is why Roemer concludes that authoritarianism in the 
workplace "is of second- or third-order importance in maintaining 
capitalism and its injustices."46 
The point is this: if circumstances are such that prospective 
employees lack effective choice and are forced to consent to 
powerlessness in the firm, the proper way to undo this injustice 
is to enhance choice by repairing the background circumstances 
that unduly constrain it. The injustice is not undone if we simply 
guarantee qual outcomes in the form of political equality because 
the negotiation process is unfair, for self-government will not 
46. John Roemer, Free to Lose: An Introduction toMarxist Economic Philosophy 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), pp. 90-107. 
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render labor any less exploitable. The most that the exploitation 
objection might justify with regard to outcomes is the 
establishment of some minimum level of compensation below 
which the employment contract becomes invalid. This is the logic 
of minimum-wage and maximum-hour laws, which reduce 
freedom of contract in order to prevent exploitation of especially 
vulnerable groups.47 If labor consents to voicelessness at work 
due to exploitation, the community might establish a minimum 
degree of voice in the firm that cannot be bargained away, perhaps 
by abolishing at-will clauses or mandating unionization or even 
codetermination. But the right to workplace democracy is not the 
equivalent of the minimum wage, precisely because democratic 
voice is not the minimally acceptable compensation of voluntary 
labor but the maximum. To guarantee equal voice to all members 
of the firm is like guaranteeing each worker the same pay as the 
CEO. The obligation to prevent exploitation does not compel us 
to go that far. Society need only insist on a minimum degree of 
voice below which no employee may consent. The aim should be 
to block tyranny (abuse), but full-fledged emocracy is not the 
only cure for tyranny at work. 
Now consider the other version of the exploitation objection. 
Assume for a moment that subjection to capitalist management 
on the part of wage-labor is required . Here the robustness of 
consent is irrelevant, for subjects are simply conscripted 
regardless of choice.48 But even in this case democratic voice in 
the firm is not an entitlement of labor, although it would be in 
the management of the economy as a whole. This is because the 
"conscription" of labor in a capitalist economy only occurs 
collectively, not at the level of the firm but with regard to the 
class in its entirety. In this respect (and many others) the plight 
of slaves and proletarians differs, for slaves are conscripted 
individually by a specific owner while wage-laborers are only 
47. On the logic of minimum-wage laws as a remedy for exploitation see Joel 
Feinberg, Harm to Self (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 79; and Thomas 
Hudson, "Immutable Contract Rules, the Bargaining Process, and Inalienable 
Rights," Arizona Law Review 34 (1992): 343. 
48. According to Marx, the "surplus population of workers...forms a 
disposable industrial reserve army, which belongs to capital just as absolutely as if 
the latter had bred it at its own cost" (Capital, p. 784). In this sense workers are 
virtual conscripts, the capitalist equivalent of the Trotskyist labor army 
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conscripted as a class. Slaves are therefore morally entitled to 
voice-rights in the firm but conscripted wage-laborers only gain 
voice-rights in the management of capital as a whole. To claim 
that capital conscripts labor is to imply that capital is a public 
institution, the economic equivalent of the polity. Like residents, 
employees would therefore be entitled to an equal say in the 
management of capital, but only capital in the aggregate. 
Employees of any given capitalist firm would be no more entitled 
to self-government in that firm than civil servants are entitled 
to self-government in their particular agency. Dahl's proof does 
not hold for public employees because the third condition in the 
seven-point list is not met: that binding collective decisions ought 
to be made only by persons who are subject to the decisions. 
Police officers, for example, are not morally entitled to choose 
their bosses as if they were a self-governing collective because 
law enforcement is a public good, the property of the entire 
demos. The citizenry as a whole, given its subject status, has the 
right to choose the management of this agency, and police officers 
only share in that right in their capacity as citizens, not 
employees. The same would hold true if firms are nationalized 
as a public good. Citizens then acquire the moral right to choose 
management but the employees of each nationalized firm do 
not. Of course, the demos may decide to establish a democratic 
structure of governance in each firm, but that is a matter of 
discretion and would depend on a consequentialist calculation 
of the relative benefits of workplace democracy from the 
standpoint of the community as a whole. 
On either version of the exploitation objection, then, the case 
for a moral right to workplace democracy fails. If we say that the 
subjection of labor is required2, the parallel case collapses because 
the subjection option is only hollow but not absent. The exploita- 
tion that undercuts the subjection option should certainly be 
undone, but voice per se will not rectify the injustice. By contrast, 
if we say that the subjection of labor is required1, the parallel case 
is sustained but employees are still not morally entitled to voice- 
rights in the firm. The selection of management in this case 
becomes the privilege of the demos and its representatives, while 
employees in the firm become their public servants. 
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I conclude, then, that a moral right to workplace democracy 
on grounds of distributive justice does not exist. Employees are 
not like citizens because power is not claimed over them regardless 
of choice. For that reason employees cannot claim an equal share 
of power in the firm as a matter of right, because the norm of 
distributive justice to which Dahl subscribes is not violated. Unlike 
residents, employees possess a subjection option, which means 
that their subjection to authoritarian rule is a matter of discretion. 
Until this choice is shown to be invalid or irrelevant, their 
subjection cannot be described as an injustice. 
It can, nonetheless, be described as undesirable. In addition 
to his moral-rights proof, Dahl develops a consequentialist 
argument for workplace democracy in A Preface to Economic 
Democracy.49 That argument has much going for it, though I do 
think he overstates the case."5 Whatever its specific defects, 
however, Dahl's consequentialist argument does have the virtue 
of according more consistently with the democratic impulse that 
has animated his life's work. An argument framed in terms of 
what is desirable for the community leaves it to the demos to 
determine how the economy should be structured and what the 
rights and duties of employers and employees ought to be, without 
the impediment to popular sovereignty of moral-rights claims. If 
we take this approach, the distribution of power in the firm 
becomes an open question, and we can better accommodate the 
need for diversity and experimentation than the one-size-fits-all 
solution of moral rights. 
This is in fact the approach Dahl took to the question before 
he worked out his theory of procedural democracy. In Politics, 
Economics, and Welfare, he and Charles Lindblom argued that with 
regard to the governance of the firm, "there do not seem to be any 
49. Dahl, Preface to Economic Democracy, pp. 84-110. 
50. For a powerful defense of workplace democracy on consequentialist 
grounds see Schweickart, Against Capitalism, pp. 88-136; for a more skeptical view 
see Henry Hansmann, The Ownership ofEnterprise (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1996), pp. 66-119. For further reflections on the possible costs of mandatory 
democratization of firms ee Robert Mayer, "Is there a Moral Right to Workplace 
Democracy?" Social Theory and Practice 26 (2000): 22-25. 
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a priori grounds for preferring one organizational form to another 
or for prescribing any single solution for every enterprise."51 
Likewise, in After the Revolution? Dahl claimed that in a rational 
society the governance of firms 
would be looked upon as a concrete, practical question to be decided 
after taking into account the particular circumstances of the enterprise. 
Depending on these circumstances, the government of the enterprise 
could take many different forms. Just as people in such a society would 
think it irrational to believe that one form of democracy is invariably 
preferable to the others, so they would think it foolish to decide a priori 
that one form for governing economic enterprise is preferable to others 
in all circumstances.52 
This rejection of a priori solutions, unfortunately, was lost from 
sight as Dahl sought to devise for his vision of a democratic 
economy "a stronger justification, one with a more Kantian 
flavor.""3 But as we have seen, that neo-Kantian justification is in 
fact more vulnerable to refutation than the consequentialist 
argument it displaced. 
51. Dahl and Lindblom, Politics, Economics and Welfare, p. 477. 
52. Dahl, After the Revolution?, pp. 116-17. For a more recent expression of the 
same view see "Social Reality and 'Free Markets': A Letter to Friends in Eastern 
Europe," Dissent 37 (1990): 227. 
53. Dahl, Preface to Economic Democracy, p. 111. 
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